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The metaphysical system of Thomas Aquinas is a power
ful instrument, the correct application of which provides the
solutions to many ancient and modern problems in philoso
phy. The difficulty is, however, that the system is just as
subtle as it is powerful: a misapplication of its principles in
solving one of these problems will inevitably lead to further
complications. In this paper I examine such a case.
In an interesting paper, Henry Veatch explores the syn
thetic a priori as it relates to the philosophy of Thomas
Aquinas. In it he correctly argues that there is no easy
reconciliation of the positions, yet Aquinas' principia per se
nota fulfils Kant's demand for necessary truths about the
world. The question 'how are synthetic a priori judgements
possible?' becomes, for Thomists, the question 'how do the
principia per se nota of the various sciences yield genuine
information about the world?'. In answering the latter ques
tion, I argue that Veatch fails to distinguish the methods
proper to the different sciences. As a result of this failure, he
turns Thomistic metaphysics into an empirical science, one
which lacks the necessity and universality of true Thomistic
metaphysics.
I: The Synthetic A Priori and Thomistic Epistemology
Kant famously divides judgements into analytic and
synthetic. An analytic proposition is one in which the predi
cate is contained in the concept of the subject. A synthetic
proposition is one in which the predicate is added to the
concept of the subject. Thus analytic truths are true 'by
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definition', and are known to be true once their terms are
understood. Synthetic propositions, however, need some
thing other than the terms involved for verification. In the
case of synthetic a posteriori judgements, sense experience
verifies whether they are true or false. In the case of synthetic
a priori judgements, however, Kant believed some 'third'
thing must be added to the concepts to 'guarantee' its truth.
The first principles (the principia per se nota), or founda
tions, of Thomistic science are self-evident propositions.
These principles are known in themselves (thus are per se
nota) and are better known than the conclusions which follow
from them. Aquinas states that 1/ a proposition is self-evident
because the predicate is included in the essence of the sub
ject" (Summa I,q.2,a.l). For example, 'Man is an animal' is
self-evident because animalis included in the essence of man.
The truth of the proposition is known when one understands
that animal is included in the essence of man.
Clearly, in the Kantian classification, the principia per se
nota are analytic. This would not be a problem for Thornists,
except for the implications of such a classification. As Veatch
states, [a]nalytic propositions, it turns out, since they in
volve no more than a mere analysis of what is already
contained in our concepts, are held to be of no real factual
import at all" (Veatch 243). Since, it is argued, analytic
propositions are true merely because we happen to use
language in a certain way they are informative, not of the
world or facts, but only of the conventions of our language.
If a proposition claims to be about the world, it cam10t be
analytic. If it cannot be analytic it must be synthetic, and thus
appeal to something other than the nature of the proposition
itself to determine its truth. Thomists claim, however, that
the per se nota propositions are necessary and yet a t the same
time give information about reality" (Copleston 28). On the
Kantian classification, however, this is not possible. If a
proposition is about the world or informative then it must be
synthetic and appeal to something other than its intrinsic
nature to guarantee its truth.
II

It
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If the Kantian scheme is correct, then for Thomists the
assertions of metaphysics would be purely verbat nothing
more" (Veatch 256). A Thomist, therefore, simply cannot
accept Kant's distinction1• The Thomist maintains, contra
Kant, that it is possible for a proposition to be necessarily true
in virtue of its intrinsic nature and still be genuinely informa
tive (Le. not be purely verbal). It is not enough, however,
merely to say Kant is wrong, for Kant showed how he
thought synthetic a priori propositions, on his account, were
possible. One must show how such 'analytic informative'
propositions are possible. If not, there is no reason to reject
Kant, and Thomistic science would be groundless. Thus for
Thomists, the question 'how are synthetic a priori judge
ments possible?' amounts to 'how are the principia per se nota
informative about the world?'.
This is exactly what Veatch attempts to answer. He tries
to show that the per se nota propositions can be true by the
meanings of the terms involved (analytic in Kant's terms),
give information about the world (synthetic in Kant's terms)
and necessarily true (a priori). He does so by arguing "one
can readily see that there is no reason at all why such truths
should not be informative or should not be truths about the
world" (Veatch 254). At the end of his response, however, he
runs into serious problems for the principles of metaphysics,
claiming "is there not a sense in which even these principles
fall short of strict universality and necessity?" (Veatch 260).
In the following, I argue that Veatch's response is mis
taken beca use he fails to distinguish the different methods of
the sciences. He doesn't recognize that principles can be
about the world in different ways. By answering'how can per
se nota propositions be about the world?', I show that the
correct response avoids the problems Veatch runs into.
/I

II: The Division of Thomistic Speculative Sciences

Aquinas stressed the necessity of distinguishing the dif
ferent methods of the different sciences: For this reason they
are in error who try to proceed in the same way in these three
1/
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parts of speculative science" (Aquinas Q.6,a.2). The three
speculative sciences are natural science, mathematics and
metaphysics. Since Veatch focuses on natural science and
metaphysics they will be my primary focus. The sciences
differ in object and method and so, naturally, they will differ
in the nature of their judgments. In order to see how and why
they differ, I must examine their objects and methods.
As Aquinas states, lithe speculative sciences are differen
tiated according to their degree of separation from matter
and motion" (Aquinas Q.5,a.l). The objects of natural science
cannot exist nor be considered without matter. The natural
scientist studies "mutable and material things existing out
side the soul through natures... that are immobile and consid
eredwithout particular matter" (Aquinas Q.5,a.3). The meta
physician studies things which mayor may not exist without
matter and can be considered without matter.
Aquinas' account of the nature and method of the sci
ences requires two distinct operations of the intellect. The
first is the "understanding of indivisible by which it knows
what a thing is" (Aquinas Q.5,a.3). This operation considers
a thing's nature without taking the existence or non-existence
of the object into account. It can also abstract truthfully what
is not separate in reality, since it does not concern itself with
actual existence.
The second operation of the intellect "joins and divides,
by forming affirmative and negative statements" (Aquinas
Q.5,a.3). This operation deals exclusively with a thing's
existence. Since truth is an adequation of mind and thing, this
operation must compose and divide according to what is
composed and divided in reality. Upon grasping what
'grass' and'green' are, the mind composes the two in 'Grass
is green'. Contrastingly, the mind divides man and stone, in
'Man is not a stone'. This operation deals with a thing's
existence, judging that it exists in one way or does not exist in
another. As Aquinas states, lithe operation by which it
composes and divides, it distinguishes one thing from an
other by understanding that the one does not exist in the
other" (Aquinas Q.5,a.3).
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Both of these operations are important for the present
issue. The per se nota propositions are judgements made by
the second operation of the intellect. As such, they are
judgements about the being or existence of the objects in
question. The'analytic nature' of the propositions rests on
the first operation of the intellect. 'Man is an animal' is a
judgement aboutthe way men exist. The judgement is based
on the mind grasping the nature of man and animal in the first
operation and forming the judgement in the second. This is
a preliminary response to the problem of how judgements
can be necessarily true by virtue of their terms alone, and also
be informative (Le. not merely verbal). It is preliminary,
however, because the different sciences' grasp' and 'judge' in
different ways, a fact Veatch overlooks. To understand how
each science proceeds, we must understand the different
methods of the sciences.
Natural science and metaphysics distinguish their ob
jects in different ways. Natural science distinguishes its
objects by simple apprehension or "through the same opera
tion which is the abstraction of a universal from a particular"
(Aquinas Q.5,a.3). It grasps the essence or nature of an object,
not by abstracting the form from matter (as in mathematics)
butby abstracting the universal from the partkular individu
als. This is abstractio totius. For example, the mind abstracts
, man' from Plato and Socrates,leaving aside their designated
matter and accidents.
Metaphysics, however, does not distinguish its objects by
simple apprehension, but "through the operation of the
intellect joining and dividing which is properly called sepa
ration; and this belongs to divine science or metaphysics"
(Aquinas Q.5,a.3). Since metaphysics is concerned with
being as being, negative judgements are its primary method
for distinguishing. The judgements of the second operation
ofthe intellect deal primarily with the act of exis ting ofthings.
In contrast, the act of simple apprehension deals with a
thing's essence. Metaphysics, therefore, will have to be an
inherently and uniquely existential science. The objects of
metaphysics are those things which may, but need not, exist
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in matter. By considering such objects in negative judge
ments, the metaphysician at once denies their dependencyon
matter and affirms their act of being. In short, he considers
being as being.
Metaphysics and natural science also proceed by differ
ent methods. Natural science proceeds by an especially
rational method. 'This procedure is 'rational' in two ways.
First it remains closest to sensation. Since its objects can
neither be considered nor exist without matter, it is inevitably
linked to the material world given in sensation. Secondly, it
proceeds discursively from one thing to another. In it dem
onstration takes place through extrinsic causes, [and] some
thing is proved of one thing through another thing entirely
external to it", and therefore" the method of reas on is particu
larly observed in natural science, and on this account natural
science among all others is most ill conformity with the
human intellect" (Aquinas Q.6,a.l).
Metaphysics, however, proceeds in a very different man
nero The meta physician proceeds intellectually. As Aquinas
states, " divine science proceeds intellectually not as though
it makes no use of reason ... but because its reasoning most
closely approaches intellectual considerations and its conclu
sions are closestto its principles" (Aquinas Q.6,a.1.,r.1). Since
the objects of metaphysics are intellectual (i.e. surpass the
imagination and sensation), the method must also be intellec
tuaL It proceeds by apprehending truth simply, more syn
thetic than the analytic, discursive rational method. In this
sense it more closely resembles the intellect of separate
substances, and thus it is a struggle for man, who is called a
rational animal precisely because the rational method Is proper
to him.
Natural science and metaphysics differ in the way in
which they distinguish their objects, the method by which
they proceed, and they also differ in their end or terminus. 2
As Aquinas states all our knowledge begins in the senses ...
but knowledge does not always termillate in the same way"
(Aquinas Q.6,a.2). Natural science deals with objects which
cannot be conceived or exist without matter, and the rational
method it employs is tied closely to sense data. The tenninus,
/I
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therefore, "of knowledge in natural science must be in the
senses, with the result that we judge of natural beings as the
senses manifest them" (Aquinas Q.6,a.2). Our judgements in
natural science must correspond to, and must be modified
with new sense data, our sense experience.
The objects and method of metaphysics, however, are
intellectual. As Aquinas states: "There are other beings
however, that transcend both that which falls under the
senses and that which falls under the imagination", and
"when we know things of this kind through judgement, our
knowledge must terminate neither in the imagination nor in
the senses" (Aquinas Q.6,a.2). The judgements of metaphys
ics terminate in the intellect and are not subject to empirical
verification like the judgements of natural science.
In this section I have examined the different methods,
ways of distinguishing objects, and termini. These differ
ences have important consequences for the way in which the
principles of the different sciences are'about the world'. In
the next section, I will explore some of these consequences,
and in the process solve the problems encountered by Veatch.
III: The Principia Per Se Nota as 'Synthetic'

As Veatch argued, and I agreed with above, the question
for Thomists of the possibility of synthetic a priori proposi
tions is really the question of how the principia per se nota can
be about the world or genuinely informative. Veatch an
swers this problem quite convincingly. His solution, how
ever, is overly simplistic. It is because of this simplicity he
encounters problems in dealing with the principles of meta
physics.
The argument against the informative nature of'analytic'
propositions was that, since their truth was determined by
the definitions of the terms involved, they were merely truths
abou t the way in which we use language. Veatch argues that
self-evident propositions are informative because they are
talking about the world. For example, 'Man is an animal' is
not a judgement about the way we happen to use the word
'man', Rather it is a judgement about those objects which we
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happen to call 'men', specifically they are the sorts of things
we call 'animals'. The confusion, Veatch argues, rests on a
confusion between what is meant and the meaning. Per se
nota propositions are judgements about things.
Secondly, the objective nature of per se nota propositions
serve to refute the claim that analytic propositions are mere
verbalisms. The proposition 'Man is an animal' is self
evident (analytic), "[b Jut clearly, the self-evidence of this
principle does not have to turn on our understanding the
meaning of man or animal" (Veatch 258). 'Man is an animal'
is self-evident because of the intrinsic nature of the proposi
tion, independently of our understanding it, or calling a man
a man, or an animal an animal. The proposition is only self
evident because the nature of man includes animal. Thus the
proposition must be informative. As Veatch concludes:
if 'dependence on meanings and concepts' is under

stood as dependence on the things so meant and the
objects so conceived, then the truth of a self-evident
proposition will of course depend on the facts in the
case and on the way the world is" (Veatch 259).
Concluding from these two arguments, Veatch asks:
Who says then, that the self-evident truths of meta
physics cannot be about the world and cannot even
claim to be factual statements at all? No; the self
evidence of such principles means just that they are
evident through the facts themselves that these prin
ciples are about and not through any other facts or
anything else whatever. (Veatch 260)
After thus concluding, Veatch runs into more problelTIs. If
the principles of metaphysics are informative in this way, are
about the facts, then how can they maintain their necessity
and universality? He develops this problem in two ways.
First, it seems as though "these principles [of metaphys
ics] are able to have factual import and to apply to the real
world only if there is such a world or created universe for
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them to apply to" 01ea tch 261). Furthermore, the existence of
the world is contingent upon the will of God. These prin
ciples must positthatthere are such objects as they are talking
about, and such a positing is notnecessary nor universaL The
example he uses is 'If anything is an accident, then it can only
be the accident of a substance'. If such a proposition can have
factual import only if there is a world to apply to then it must
also add 'There are such accidents in the world'. The second
proposition, Veatch argues, is neither necessary nor univer
saL
The second problem Veatch faces is that if the principles
of metaphysics require i facts' to apply to, and the facts of our
world are contingent, then will it not likewise be contingent
and open to question whether these particular self-evident
propositions or some others are the ones that apply to the
facts of our world?" (Veatch 261). Veatch argues that if this
world is contingent then it may be ordered according to
different principles then those of Thomistic metaphysics. If
so then how is it possible to determine which principles are
correct? One can conceive of other possible worlds, and one
can conceive that our world is ordered differently than we
had thought. Given the conceivable alternatives, "how are
we to know which order is the actual one?" for:
II

it would seem that it could not be by experience that

we know that the order of our world is one of sub
stance-accident, of cause-effect, and so on, since expe
rience can never guarantee the requisite universality
and necessity of such principles. (Veatch 262)
And this problem returns once again to the beginning, and to
how propositions about the world can be necessarily true, or
'How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?'.
Veatch faces these problems because he did not answer
the original question correctly. More directly, he failed to
distinguish the methods of the different sciences. Drawing
from what I said above, I shall now show where Veatch falls
into error, and that the true Thomistic position avoids such
problems in its solution.
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Veatch has no problems with the way in which the
principles of natural science are informative. In fact, his
example, 'Man is an animal' is a principle of natural science.
In natural science, the intellect abstracts the essence or nature
of its object, in this case man. The judgement based on this
nature, 'Man is an animal' is self-evident to us because we
have grasped the nature of man. This judgement is based on
the nature, but strictly speaking it is about the world because
the terminus of the science is sensation. We know they are
true because they are self-evident, but they are only true
because the judgements conform to what sensation delivers.
It is clear that natural science and its principles will be
informative or 'about the world' because its method and
terminus never strays from sensation.
Here Veatch is correct in claiming the principia per se no l'a
are informative, even though his explanation is simplistic.
All principia per se nota, however, are not alike. What Veatch
does is force metaphysics to conform to the methods of
natural science. In short, he makes metaphysics empirical by
demanding its principles be 'about tlle world' in the same
way the as the principles of natural science. Metaphysics has
a different method and terminus than natural science and
therefore its principles apply to, the world in a different
manner; if one does not recognize this, he will be faced with
the same problems as the 'empirical metaphysics' of Veatch.
The question now is, how do the principles of metaphys
ics apply to the world? The judgements and principles of
metaphysics are about the world in a rather peculiar way. To
begin with metaphysics distinguishes its objects by separa
tion. As we have seen this makes the subject inherently
existential. In the beginning, therefore, metaphysics has a
great deal of factual import. The procedure or method of
metaphysics, however, removes it from the realm of sensa
tion, and presumably form Veatch's factual world. This
culminates in the terminus of metaphysics, which is the
intellect. It seems as though its judgements are too transcen
dent to be about the world. On this very subject,however, the
eminent Thomist Jacques Maritain remarks:
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The judgement wherein knowledge is perfected opens
upon the pure intelligible. For it is not because (as in
the case of the philosophy of nature) it depends
essentially on sensible experience, but rather because
of its transcendence, that metaphysics descends (as
mathematics does not) to the world of sensible exist
ence. (Maritain 56)
It is because of the transcendence of metaphysical objects and

judgements that they apply to the sensible world.
The subject matter of metaphysics is being as being.
Anything which actually or possibly exists does so because it
possesses being. Since the judgements of metaphysics apply
to ens inquantum ens, they apply to all beings. Since the
judgements are about all being, it applies to the specific type
of being which is called sensible being. Furthermore it
applies to God as that which is saidofthe effect applies to the
cause. This is how the judgements of metaphysics apply to
our world.
From this we can see the problems Veatch encountered
need not have arisen. Since the judgements apply to all being
(ens commune), they necessarily apply to sensible being, even
though they are not about sensible being. We need not posit
that 'there are such things as accidents in the world' for 'If
anything is an accident, then it can only be the accident of a
substance' to be universally and necessarily true. For it is a
claim about being in itself, the perfect instance of which is
God, and God is ultimately necessary. Furthermore the claim
is universal insofar as it applies to all possible being and
beings. Veatch, therefore, is mistaken when he questions
how we know the principles apply to other possible worlds
or even if our world is so ordered. The judgements of
metaphysics apply to all possible being and beings.
As to the question 'how are synthetic a priori judgements
possible?' we have seen that for Thomists this amounts to
'how do the principia per Be nota of the various sciences yield
genuine information about the world?'. I have argued that
Veatch answered this question incorrectly and in doing so
turned metaphysics into an empirical science. I have also
given the correct Thomistic response to the question, a re
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sponse which (based on the distinction of the objects and
methods of the various sciences) solves the problem while
preserving the integrity, necessity and value of metaphysical
knowledge.
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NOTBS

1. IIln short, on the issue of the possibility of the synthetic
a priori, there just is not any way of avoiding a choice as
between Aquinas and Kant. One either has to fish ... with
Aquinas, or be content to cut bait with Kant" (Veatch 253).
2. Maurer defines terminus as where the intellect finds
in the data grasped by the faculty in question the evidence
on which it bases the truth of its judgement".(p.74,n.1)
II

